The attack on the judiciary during the pandemic

In this article I will analyse the impact that from my point of view the legislation dictated during the pandemic has had on the normal functioning of the judiciary, I will refer to how the necessary separation and division between the separate branches of the State has been altered, and I will recount how the system of checks and balance inherent in a social and democratic state of law has been disturbed. I will also describe the impact on our social and democratic State of Law, which carries the principle of separation and division of powers and the existence of a regime of checks and balances between the different branches of the State has had Royal Decree 463/2020, of March 14, which declared the state of alarm for the management of the health crisis caused by COVID-19 that meant the interruption of the normal functioning of the judiciary during the state of alarm, and, of Law 3/2020, of September 18, on procedural and organizational measures to deal with Covid-19 in the field of the administration of justice that established an unconstitutional conmixture between the Executive Power and the Judiciary.

Institutions and the politics of agency in COVID-19 response: Federalism, executive power, and public health policy in Brazil, India, and the U.S

The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 was one of the rare events that shocked almost every world government simultaneously, thus creating an unusual opportunity to understand how political institutions shape policy decisions. There have been many analyses of what governments did. We focus instead on what they could do, focusing on the institutional politics of agency - how institutions empower rather than how they constrain, and how they affect public policy decisions. We examine public health measures in the first wave (March-September 2020) in Brazil, India, and the U.S. to understand how the interplay of institutions in a complex federal context shaped COVID-19 policy-responses. We find similar patterns of concentrated federal executive agency with limited constraints. In each case, when federal leadership failed public health policy responses, federated, subnational states were left to compensate for these inefficiencies without necessary resources.

Executive‐parliamentary relations in Canada: Moving forward from the pandemic

The pandemic caused governments worldwide to respond quickly to a greater array of health, economic and social issues in a more concentrated time span than previously. The Canadian public sector had developed many of the tools needed to act with agility to support the government agenda response to these challenges. With the consent of political parties, Parliament modified its operations and passed empowering legislation to provide the executive branch with sweeping powers to act. In this turbulent time, government accountability was delayed but never forgotten as a series of conversations with senior public servants revealed. This article delves into those reflections on the first year of the pandemic to discern how government operations changed and how both Parliament and the public sector can adapt to ensure that government can act effectively and efficiently but be held accountable for its decisions as it addresses more complex policy challenges in future. (English) [ FROM AUTHOR] Sommaire: Sur un laps de temps plus réduit que jamais auparavant, la pandémie a forcé les gouvernements du monde entier à réagir rapidement à un plus grand nombre de problèmes sanitaires, économiques et sociaux. Le secteur public canadien a mis au point de nombreux outils nécessaires pour faire preuve d'agilité afin d'aider le programme gouvernemental dans sa réponse à ces défis. Avec le consentement des partis politiques, le parlement a modifié ses opérations et a adopté une loi constitutive pour doter l'exécutif de vastes pouvoirs d'action. En cette période troublée, l'imputabilité du gouvernement a été retardée mais jamais oubliée, comme l'a révélé une série de conversations avec des hauts fonctionnaires. Cet article explore ces réflexions sur la première année de la pandémie pour discerner comment les opérations gouvernementales ont changé;et comment le parlement et le secteur public peuvent s'adapter pour garantir que le gouvernement agisse de manière efficace et efficiente, tout en étant tenu responsable de ses décisions alors qu'il fait face à des défis politiques plus complexes à l'avenir. (French) [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Canadian Public Administration is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)

WHEN INCOMPETENCE MEETS BAD LUCK: BOLSONARO'S THIRD YEAR IN THE BRAZILI AN PRESIDENCY

The third year of the Bolsonaro presidency coincided with the second year of the pandemic of the Covid-19, and with the worsening of economic conditions in the country. This article contends that Brazil's economic performance, resulting from a unique mix of "bad luck" and incompetence, is the main driver of Bolsonaro's low popular support and unfavorable electoral prospects, six months before the poll. I rely on the literature on economic voting and on assignment of responsibility to argue that this is true because citizens (1) have short memory, (2) do not discount exogenous conditions when casting an economic vote, and (3) hold the president responsible for economic outcomes. I conclude by discussing how the early realization of a potential electoral loss helps explain Bolsonaro's growing focus on his core support base and systematic attempts to challenge the fairness of Brazilian elections.

Engagement without accountability: The role of governments, field experts, and public intellectuals in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic

The outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic represented a major shock. In their effort to adapt their responses to the crisis to their own conditions of survival, governments have tended to resort to arguments that limit accountability to the population. Despite the privileged place they are presumed to have within contemporary societies, experts have been displaced from the decision-making processes of governments and delegitimized by the anti-intellectual drift favored by the way in which arguments are presented and debated in social media. At the same time, despite being perceived as capable of offering inside-out evaluations of specific phenomena and therefore capable of distinguishing between truths and big lies (and anything in-between), the role of public intellectuals seems to have been limited. The article analyses the responses of great power governments and regional powers in terms of the discursive practices deployed in the context of the covid-19 crisis, and the capacity of the aforementioned non-institutional actors to confront these discourses. As ‘editors-in-chief’, policymakers have felt passionate about war metaphors that have allowed them to deconstruct and make complex subjects accessible, and as such, to ensure a sufficient level of attention and public approval so that the fight against the enemy could begin. In addition, they have prompted the implementation of emergency measures that, in a context of geopolitical confrontation, have allowed them to evade individual responsibilities. Rather than using their knowledge to provide constructive examination of complex issues and make them accessible, so the ones who listen to them can hopefully understand the impact of specific policy preferences and minimize their own losses in the increasingly competitive environment, experts and intellectuals have seen their room for maneuver to influence policy formulations severely limited. © 2021, RUDN UNiversity. All rights reserved.